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IN 'l'.HF SUJ.'I\EME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

)
)

ELIZABETH JONES,
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a-~,d

Appellant,

)
)
vs.
)
)
ll0J\1\1AN'S INC., A Utah Corporation,
)
ALLEN STEEL COMPANY, A Utah
)
Corpor~Ltion, JOHN DOE, and RICHARD ROE,)
)
Defendants and Respondents.
)

No.
9956

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries resulting
when a steel beam fell and struck plaintiff.
DLSPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The trial court granted the motions of defendants
for sumn1ary judgment, and from that judgment,
plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the summary judgment.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
D~~fcndant,

Horman's Inc., and defendant, Allen

Steel Comp"'ny •'!ach filed a motion for summary
judg1nent to be heard at the pretrial of this action
(R. 29, 30, 31). At the ~)retrial, on May 8, 1963, said
.tnotions V'ere considered a1:..d pb•·.-L1ti.ff requested
leave to amend her

complain~~.

It .was plaintiff's

u,·,lcrstanding that leave to amend had been granted
and plaintiff

fil~d

an amended complaint on May 20,

1963. (R. 36,37). The memorandum of defendant,
Horman's Inc., refers to plaintiff's state1n ent concerning arnending of plaintiff's coLlplaint (R. 55).
At the pretrial, counsel were given leave to file
memorandums (R. 35). Defendant, Horman's Inc.,
filed a memorandum on May 13, 1963, (R. 52 to 56)
and defendant, Allen Steel Company, filed a memorandum on May 20, 1963, (R. 57 to 63}.

Plaintiff

filed a reply to said memorandums on May 20, 1963,

.

(R. 64 to 67}. Each of said defendant's memorandums
contained a statement of facts (R. 52, 53, 57, 58)
which plaintiff for the purpose of argument in
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··3conq,:ct'

.l v.dth s,"\.1 n1otio1 _;for

!n~;p!~ a :cep~

,,d

s

st<r

<It1nry j:td

,-~

,·ttlL_ot.ant7.ally :orrcct (R. 64).

Th'"'·c·eafter on J ,_,lc 3, 19/,3, an orde.l· was entered
grauting said

111

nt:

tl.S

for s urn~ ary

j udgi ~~ c nt ( ;~.

IZ, 43).

The record cont _-~ns the
pl~:tli- Cf (;~.50)

Jone~, (R. 51).

:c>

ealcd deposi

_;_0 11

of

and o:fhc!:' h• sp~_tld, Jt~l.i.u:j Earl
Neither has been unsealed or intro ·

duced hd~f) evidence (R. 50, 51).

the 3tater.n .1t off; c:ts c ()_t·Jined J.n defen( 1 ·1.nts'
.1nemorandunls (R. 52, 53, r:7, 58) viewed most
£2. ·orably to plaintiff:

Defendzut, Horrnan's Inc., a general contractrJ'.:",
c'nl~loyed

was

to

b~·ild

an adu:_:ion to the Town

House ..Athl. i·.".c Club at 158 South 3rd East, in Salt
La\e C ~.ty, Ut2h.
h:-l a

fur;j

:.j!i'·

~J:

D.:>ferdant,

~·contl'act

.~..\llen

Steel Co-,·:1 c.::'ny,

-.vi:<h said Horman's Inc.

to

ar 1 erect the steel in said COl1.Struc ':.5. -:n job.

C,1 -':!1e morning 0£ March 27, 1')62, plaintiff's
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h

with

?\1r. Hoffi•lC, a n1asonry subcontractor under

said Horman's Inc., which took place at Albertson's
~\larket

at 3rd South and 4th East, Salt Lake City, Uta·

The masonry contractor told plaintiff's husband that
as soon as the steel was up on the aforesaid construe
tion job, that the masonry contractor would probably
be able to usc plaintiff's husband on that job. No
one from either of the aforesaid defendants asked
plaintiff's h• .s band to go to the Town House Athletic
Club.
On the same day, plaintiff's husband observed
the beams being unloaded from a truck.
On the evening of March 27,1962, plaintiff's
hu:~band

asked plaintiff if plaintiff woul.d walk to

the Town House Athletic Club with him to see
"how near the steel is up".

Plaintiff and her

husband walked from their aparbn ent to the said
site, arl'iving about 7:30p.m. that evening.

Plaintiff'

husband did not observe any workmen or other
persons on the premises. When plaintiff and her
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husband arrived at the s ·.tc2 plaintiff was tired so

hc~r

h1t>h<1nd

pl::.ced

for her to sit on.

a building block on the ground

The block '.vas placed on the

ground adjacent to large steel
fee:, lo g, 2 to

zt feet wide

r,ir.lcr:~,

about 80

at the ends and about 5

feet .vide in the center. The t) ··-:lers were laying
ea:3t to west, and had been set on edge in a driveway which had been dug down to he bottom of the
foundation of the buildi tg so equipment could b..;
taken out of the bas erne nt, and_

!h~~

girders were

mostly i.n the driveway, but the ends were protrudb1g <-lbove the ground level of the ramp. A
2 :< 12 was bol

~d

to the top of the girders, and

they were held tog-ether by a 1 x

L~

nailed across

the top. ·
While plaintiff was sitting on the building

b1r~ck

facing to the south a1d her husband was looking at
the building,_ th·:> steel g5.rders tipped over.

Plaintiff

did not see th;:·ln fall, but her husband heard the
beams bump against each other as they started to
fall and grabbed plaintiff, pulling her toward the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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south.

Plaintiff suffered a scraped back and a

-6LJ okcn 'oc

8

.1

result of the ;)ccidcnt.

POINT 1
THE DIS 'T RICT
THE ~. , JTIONS OF
J UDG .· (ENT, BECI
MATTER O..t.<' LAW
INVITES.

COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
DEFENDANTS FOR SU!v1MARY
USE IT CANNOT BE SAID AS A
THAT ·· ~· ..JAINTIFF W.P..S NOT AN

As is often the case in appeals from summary
judgments, the .record is not very corrprehensive
in this case.
In the case of Thompson v. Ford Motor Company, 1
Case No. 9807, decided August 13, 1963, the Supreme
Court of Utah held that it could. not consider sealed
depc. sitions and will only look to the record proper
to determine the issues.

rfhus the depositions may

not be considered. Any defect in plaintiff's complaint
must also be ignc c.·ed as concerns the summary judgmcnt because of the proceedure followed to present
the facts to the court for purpos ~s of s um :-o ary
judg;nent. Had the court denied the motions for a
su ~

1n1ary

5 '-ldgmr~nt,

it would undoubtedly have entered
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a p.cetrial or

"r which uncle :. btedly would have con-

-7-

taincd an order granting pl ti:·Liff leave to amend.
Defendants m ainl aineu that unde1 the facts
contained in their n1emor:.ndwn, the defendants
owed 1>laintiff no duty blcause, as a matter of law,
plaintiff was eiLhLJ. (1) a tresspasser, or (2)

R

licensee anc: that as a matter of law plaintiff's
injuries were not the result of wilful or wanton
conduct, nor of active negligence nor was this a
case where defendants knew of the dangerous condition a11.d defendants had reason to believe that
plaintiff would not discover the condition.

Plaintiff

maintained and argued that plaintiff was an invitee
and that in any ev _;nt it can't be said as a matte1· of
law that

pla~ntiff

was not an invitee.

Thus the issue of plaintifr s status as an invitee,
licensee or tresspasser was presented to the
district . court under the facts set out in the memorandtm1s, and the only issue on appeal thus, is
whether under these same facts, it can be said as
a matter of Ltw plaintiff was not an invitee and also
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. il

.-!,. ~icensee that as a m ttte c of law plainti1·r· s

injuries were not the result of wilful or wanton
conduct and were not the result of active negligence
and that defend ants did not know of the dangerous
condition or if they did, defendants had no reason
to 1.:1 i.eve that pJ.aintiff would not discove1· it.
Plait1t:i.ff contends that she was an invitee at the
time she was injured and that in any event, it
cannot be s:1id "as a matter of law that she was not
an i:nvitee.
The definition of an invitee is a question of law.
Whether or not plaintiff is an invitee is a question
of fact for the· jury, unless reasonable minds could
only reach the conclusion that plaintiff did not fit
the definition.
Viewing tre facts most favo"t"ably to the plaintiff,
as the court is required to do in ruling on a motion
for summary judgment by

~e~endants, plaintif~'s

husband w·ent to the said job site to see how far
along they were with

tb~

steel, because the masorry

contrac~~or
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for said job had told him that when the

';

steel was up he would ,)robably be
on

tl~Ztt

job. It

•~ble

l;-; LOW

u~,e

him

as, )f c JUrse, necessary for pla-'.n-

iiJL's husband to follow the pror;.rc..;s o;
ord cr to

to

~-he

work in

when to contact the masonry contrac ··

tor again about the job. In going : o said job

si~e,

p L dntiff' s husband was perform :i ng a task which the
m;~.sonry

contractor had thus by implication given

him, to-wit: to keep track of the progress of work at
said job site. It

car~

1oi be said as o. matter of law tha

plaintiff's husband perforrr)ed this task in an

urJ~e:t

sonablc manner or in an area to which his invitation
did 1~ot extend.

Plaintiff's husband was on the job

site for a legitin1ate reason, for a reason related
to the defendants construction business, and for a
reason of mutual interest to plaintiff's husband and
defendants, to-wit: the masonry work on said job.
This was especially of interest to defendant,

Horman~

Inc., the general contractor.
It has been held that an employee of a subcontrac
tor is an invitee of the main contractor. See Florez
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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v. Groom Development Co,, 53 C.&I347,348 P. Zd 200

-10The same rule should apply bctYJeen a subcontractor and an employee of another subcontractor.
-- ~--------------------------------

Logically the rule should be the same for a
wo:r:kma.n who is negotiating for

~mployment

as

for one who has already been employed. The idea
of mutual advaptage is present in both cases.
Where a person enters the premises for a·
purpose related to the occupant's business or for
a purpose that involves some matter of mutual
business interest, or advantage, an invitation to
use the premises _may be inferred. When the
masonry contractor had been engaged to perform
work upon said job site, then the activities of said
masonry contractor on said job site in furtherence
of his contract would be of mutual interest and

.

advantage to defendants. If, pursuant to his contract
the masonry contractor found it .necessary to emplay-workers, then this too is a matter of mutual
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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busine

· terest an

v antage, to defendants;

-ulikewise, since negotiations and planning for such
empbyment ar(; a necessary part of employn1ent,
they too are of mutual business interest, and advan··
tage to dc.l.endants. In this case, the presence of
plaintiff's husband at said job

sih~

was a part of

the negotiations and planning between

th~

masonry

contractor and plaintiff's husband. In the case of
Hayward vs. Downing, 112 Utah 508, 189 P. 2nd 442
(1948), the cou1·t sa:·d:
".An invitee is ordinarily one '\vho goes upon
the prerlis es of the owner or occupant for the
purpo s · of trans acting business, or for the mutual
bcnefi:. of each of them, or for the benefit of the
occupant. He may be expressly invited to come
upo1• the premises, bu i; more commonly his invitatio.u is implied.''
Plaintiffs husband did not go to said site for his
own advantage only.

It therefor seems clear that

plaintiff's hus.band was aninvitee.
The next question presented is whether plaintiff,
who accompanied her husband to said job site, is
entitled to the same status as her husband. In the
case of Brigman vs. Fiske-Carter Construction
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773, the t)J.aintir·cwent
dcr

~1·\' :1ltt

u,~_~n :~·.c

in cornpany wHh her

p1·emi.ses of the
hu::b~lnd

who had

been exr· . ·css 1 ' / :i.nv:i.ted to conle upon t..he premises
to seek ernployn1ent. The court held in that case
that the wife was an ii.nplie•: invitee. the

cou~t

stated:

"She was neither wan~ erjng over the premise
Lor ther.'uron by reason of id.le curiosity or upon
a mission Y:hich coul,l fairly be said to be wholly
disconnected from the company's business. Her
t•.nsband h~d been exr:.ressly invited to come upon
the premis,.es to seck employment. He therefore
hal~ a right to go upon the premises; he had a rigb
to p:1rk his car near the roadway in the space
des: 1ated by defendant for such purpose. The
car of the husband was there as a result of the
invitation of the defendant and certainly the plaintiff had a ri.ght to go with her husband a ld to re-·
n1 ,_i_n in the car which was upon the premises at
a proper place, by invitation of defendant, without
bee )lTiing a trespasser or mere permissive
licensee. In truth, the p 1 ~:.. intiff's presence upon
the pren1ises cf defendant was the result of the
principles of implied invitation. Her status was
that of impU.:d invitee ... "
The c'.ifference between the Brigman case, supra,
..ld the pl'esent case is that there the
an

exprG~

~1usband

was

s invitee and L1e plaintiff's wife an in1plied

invitee, wl, (: ,_·eas here the invitaf:ion of both husband
and vife was implied, but the same rule should in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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principle ap·?lv here.

-13In the case of Fortune v. Southern Ry. Co.

150 N.C. 695,645. E. 759, the plaintiff ... ;_fe
boarded a railroad passenger car to bid her
husband good··bye,

h~

being a passenger.

injured while leaving.

She was

The court said at page 760:

"Her presence there was not wrongful,
be ·· "l.u~ c a wife who escorts a bus band or a
husb ;tnd a wife to a seat on a railway train is
not a mere trespasser to whom the company
owes no duty except to bstain from willful
injury. It is true plaintiff w :·. ~, not a passenger
towards whc•lTI the defendant \ .1 as bound to exercise
the highest degree of care, but she was on its
premises by its impFed invitation, and it was bound
to exercise ordinary c:are for her safety. Raih,,. ay
companies owe this duty at least to those who
in pr<".. ctice they allow to accompany passengers
in order to see them off on trains without asking
special permission . . . This implied L1vitation and
consequent duty to those who impelled by ties of
relationship and affection go to 'welcome the
coming or speed the parting guest' :ls founded on
recognized social observances which have become
a universal and inseparable concomitant of
modern railway traffic.''
Thus in the Fortune case the court found an
implied invitation for the wife, accompanying her
passenger husband, not only to come upon the loading
platform, but to board the car itself to say good- bye.
Although that court talked in terms of a railway
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Hs decision

has

rcco:~nL'ed

a 1nore basi.c concept, na.u1ely, ·

that in many clSpl;Cts of life, a spouse \<.Jtll 1uite
naturally accornpany her spouse on m attcrs which
not.'e specifically concern the one but
a general way concern the other.

r:~.t

least in

In view of this

tr.•it of human naLtre, it seems artificial to say

that the husband is entitled to one status but .not the wiJ
unless know ingly violating some well established
rule.
In the case of T-alus v.

Be1.·~ s,

122 Md. 467, 89 Atl.

731, .:\nn. Cas. 1916A 985, the court held in e.L(ect
that :.t could not be said as a rn .- tter of law that
\\ l1ere a father wa-:; invited to
. ossible te

~Zlncy,

t

:i.~·;;:;pect

some rooms for

lt p-,e plaintiff son, who accom-

pa1 ;ed the father, but \.\ho was not present v;hen the

father was invited to view the premises, was not an
t-

in1l)lied invitee.

\
T:1u.=· '1gain in the Kalus case the court recocJrized

that in certain cases hUlTian nature indicates that
a rnan \Tiill be accompanied by a family member
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an~ t~~fLibrary Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the farr :_lv member ;an be an implied

-15invitee.
The case of \Vheaton v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc.

15 N. E. 2nd 64, seerns to have found that a
12 year old girl, who accompanied another wo1nan
to a store on a shopping tour, was an invitee, and it
doesn't appear that they were related.
It is stated in Pross er on T9rts_ -- 2nd Ed. ai.
page 454:
"Children and friends who accompany custon1ers
with no intention of buying anything themselv cs,
people who come to r:·dlway stations to n1 eet
pass2ngers or see thc1n off, guest~. in automobiles
who go with d ·dvers to ;·~ arages, fi1 .ing stations
or par , ing lo: ::3 , tourists who v .: sit factories at
the h -.r.itation of the owner, t1 1 ose who bring ernploy ,. cs their lunch with the encouragetnent of
the n1an8.gement, and even possible purchasers
who look at displays in shop windows, or who
desjre on the particular occasion only to use a
toilet or a telephone open to the_ public, or even
the man who goes into a bank to change a five
dollar bill, all have been held to be invitees.''
In a note in 44 ALR 2d 1319 at page 1329, it is said:
"In the great n1ajority of cases the viewpoint
is taken C1at where a child accompanies 8.nothc.r
person who enters a store for the purpose of business dealings not involving the child, su:h cb.ilu
is nevertheless an invitee. In other words, th e
question whether or not it '~vc..:· necessa1·y fol' the
customer to have the child with hhn in order to
shop is im1n aterial in determining the chi1d' s
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-16POINT 2
THE DISTRICT COUl\T ERRED IN GRANTING
THE MOTIONS OF DEFENDANTS FOR A SUlvUv!AHY
JUDGMENT, BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE SAID AS A
MATTER OF LAW: (1) THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT
INJURED BY WANTON CONDUCT; (2) THAT DEFENDANTS DID NOT KNOW OF A DANGEROUS CONDITIO
ON SAID PREMISES OR THAT IF THEY DID KNOW
THEREOF THAT DEFENDANTS HAD NO REASON TO
BELIEVE THAT PLAINTIFF WOULD NOT D.lSCOVER
THE CONDITION.
Even it plaintiff is only a licensee, defendants are
not relieved of all duty toward

her~

Certainly under

_j

the circumstances of this case it cannot be said as a
matter of law that plaintiff was a trespasser and thus
at the very least there is a jury question as to whethe
or not plaintiff is a lie ens e e. ' If plaintiff is a lie ens ee
.1 ·· ·

then defendants O\ved her a duty to refrain from want
conduct injuring her. See Sanders· ·v.
73 ·Ariz. 116~ 238 P. 2d

Brown,

941 {195.1) . . It cannot

be said as a matter of law that fastening 80 foot
girders together with a 1 x 4 nailed to them, wher e
the girders are standing on edge partly on a ramp
and pa:..·tly up in the air is not wanton conduct.
Further, if plaintiff is a licensee, defendants

O\\
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had reason to believe that plaintiff would not discover

it. See Vfood v. Wood, 8 Utah 2d 279, 333 P. 2d 630
(1959). Such knowledge and belief can be implied,
and in most cases will have to be established by
implication. It cannot be said as a matter of law
that such an inference cannot be made under the
facts in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court erred
in granting defendants' motions for summary judgment, and that judgment should be reversed, and
plaintiff given the opportunity to amend her complaint
and present the issues of fact herein to a jury.
Respectfully submitted,
John E. Stone and
Robert C. Cummings
705 Utah Savings Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant
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